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Bankruptcy and Insolvency in Australia
The Honorable Mr. Justice W.M. C. Gummow*
The Australian Constitution confers upon the Federal Parliament the
power to make laws with respect to "[b]ankruptcy and insolvency. " '
Comprehensive legislation was passed as the Bankruptcy Act 1924 (Cth),
succeeded by the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
The nature and content of this power indicate two matters to be kept in
mind when comparing the Australian position with that in the United States
and Canada. First, the federal legislative power is concurrent with, rather
than exclusive of, that of the states. Thus, when there appears to be a state
law dealing with bankruptcy, the question is not whether this trespasses upon
the exclusive province of the Commonwealth's legislature, but whether the
state law must yield because it is inconsistent with a federal statute within the
meaning of section 109 of the Constitution. This is important in considering
and contrasting the position in Canada as explained in Professor Ziegel's
paper.2
The contrast between the Australian and Canadian bankruptcy jurisdiction
was well understood by the Founding Fathers:
The bankruptcy and insolvency jurisdiction is not an exclusive power of
the Federal Parliament, like that conferred on the Parliament of Canada;
it is a concurrent power. Until the Federal Parliament has passed laws
inconsistent with State laws bearing on the question, State laws will remain
in full force and effect; and until the Federal Parliament has occupied the
whole area capable of being covered by the subject, the States may
continue to pass other bankruptcy and insolvency laws, and may enforce
them so long as they do not conflict with federal laws (sec. 107-109). The
cases decided under the Constitution of the United States are valuable as
illustrating the operation of concurrent laws; those under the Canadian
Constitution are only useful as decisions showing what insolvency and
bankruptcy legislation is capable of including, and as showing what are
merely matters of local and private interests.3
* A Justice of the Federal Court of Australia. On March 28, 1995, Justice Gummow was
recommended by the Australian Commonwealth government for appointment as Justice of the
High Court of Australia.
1. AUSTL. CONST. § 51(xvii).
2. Jacob S. Ziegel, Secured Transactions in Personal Property and the Federal-Provincial
Conflict in Canadian Bankruptcy Law, 46 S.C. L. REv. 875 (1995).
3. JOHN QUICK & ROBERT R. GARRAN, THE ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION OF THE
AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH 587 (1901).
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The second point concerns the exercise of legislative power with respect
to insolvent corporations. In Canada and the United States the corresponding
federal legislative powers have been held to extend to liquidations of insolvent
corporate trading bodies.4 The Founding Fathers intended that the same
would be true in Australia.' Nevertheless, the enactment of legislative
schemes dealing with corporate insolvency has been left to the states for
inclusion in their corporate legislation. Partly, this has been because the
Commonwealth lacks the power to deal with all aspects of corporate law,
commencing with the power of incorporation. The limit on the federal
legislative power was established in 1990.6
The consequence has been the enactment, as a federal-state cooperative
scheme, of the Corporations Law. Nevertheless, the topics of individual and
corporate insolvency and bankruptcy are kept distinct, the former being dealt
with in the Bankruptcy Act 1966 and the latter in the Corporations Law. The
position is modified to some extent by provisions found in the Corporations
Law and in the earlier state statutes that "pickup," subject to qualifications, the
provisions of the federal bankruptcy law dealing with proof and ranking of
claims. 7 Further, the operation of the cooperative scheme results in the
exercise by the Federal Court of Australia of jurisdiction, not only in respect
of individual bankruptcy pursuant to the federal bankruptcy legislation, but
also in relation to corporate matters.' However, as regards bankruptcy, only
federal jurisdiction is involved, and this is vested primarily in the Federal
Court of Australia.9 All appeals must be brought to the Federal Court."
There is a provision for the transfer of proceedings from the Federal Court to
the Family Court of Australia."
One contrast with the position in the United States should be noted.
There has been no attempt in Australia by the Federal Parliament to create
what in the United States is described as "legislative courts," which operate
outside the authority of Article III of the United States Constitution.' 2 The
4. See Victoria v. Commonwealth, 99 C.L.R. 575, 612 (1957) (collecting the relevant
authorities).
5. QUICK AND GARRAN, supra note 3, at 586-87; see also Victoria v. Commonwealth, 99
C.L.R. at 575.
6. New South Wales v. Commonwealth, 169 C.L.R. 482 (1990). The opinion, The
Incorporation Case, is much-criticized.
7. Corporations Law, § 553E.
8. The operation of the cooperative scheme in relation to jurisdiction of courts, which is quite
distinct from the cross-vesting legislation scheme, is explained in Acton Eng'g Pty. Ltd. v.
Campbell, 31 F.C.R. 1, 8-11 (1991).
9. Bankruptcy Act 1966, §§ 27-39.
10. Id. § 39.
11. Id. § 35.
12. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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jurisdiction in bankruptcy matters exercised by the Federal Court of Australia
and by the state courts is federal jurisdiction exercised pursuant to Chapter III
of the Constitution.
In practice, there is little or no difficulty encountered with split jurisdic-
tion in the administration of the bankruptcy jurisdiction as regards individuals.
The position concerning corporate insolvency is more complex because the
courts of the several states, as well as the Federal Court, have concurrent
jurisdiction pursuant to the Corporations Law. There is no single intermediate
court of appeal. This has led to conflicting decisions in the administration of
the Corporations Law as between the states and as between federal and state
courts. The High Court of Australia has indicated in strong terms that
uniformity of decision in the interpretation of the cooperative corporate law is
sufficiently important to require that an intermediate appellate court, and even
more a trial judge, should not depart from an interpretation placed upon it by
another Australian intermediate appellate court "unless convinced that that
interpretation is plainly wrong."13
I turn now to consider, by way of contrast particularly with the Canadian
position, the law as it has developed in Australia as to the interplay between
bankruptcy law and the general rules of property law and the relationship
between state and federal Crown debts in insolvent administrations.
The Bankruptcy Act 1966 provides for the administration in bankruptcy
of estates of deceased persons."4 Provision of the same nature had been made
in the 1924 Act.'5 The courts have held that subsection 155(2) of the 1924
Act, in conferring on the Federal Court of Bankruptcy power to make an order
for the administration in bankruptcy of the estate of a deceased debtor, was not
ultra vires the power of the Parliament under section 51(xvii) of the Constitu-
tion. In particular, the provision was not rendered invalid by the fact that the
court could sequestrate the estate of a debtor merely because the personal
representative could not show that there was a reasonable probability of the
estate's meeting its obligations.1 6  The federal law makes provisions for
administration in bankruptcy not only upon the petition of a creditor, but upon
the petition of the administrator of the deceased estate. The practice has been
that any estate of any size is subject to administration under the federal law.
Nevertheless, it also appears to be an accepted practice that until an order is
made on a petition, the laws of the several states dealing with the administra-
tion of insolvent estates apply. Whether the federal law covers the field to
completely supplant the state laws appears never to have been tested.
13. Australian See. Comm'n v. Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd., 177 C.L.R. 485,492 (1993).
14. Bankruptcy Act 1966, §§ 244-53.
15. Bankruptcy Act 1924, §§ 155-56.
16. Re Paravicini 3 A.B.C. 15 (1930). The court referred to the discussion of the phrase
"Bankruptcy and Insolvency" in subsection 91 (21) of the British North America Act in L'Union
St., Jacques Dr. Montreal v. Belisle 6 L.R.-P.C. 31, 36-7 (1874).
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Further propositions as to the impact of the federal bankruptcy law upon
the general property law of the states are as follows:
(1) In Price v. Parsons,17 the High Court held that state law rendering
an unregistered bill of sale invalid against a trustee in bankruptcy
operated concurrently with and was not inconsistent with federal law.
The effect of the state law was to swell the assets available in the
bankruptcy administration, and the federal law did not state exhaust-
ively which antecedent transactions were to be rendered invalid.' 8
(2) The various states have enacted laws similar to the Elizabethan
statute dealing with fraudulent conveyances.' 9  In Williams v.
Lloyd"' the High Court held that in a bankruptcy administration
under federal law the Official Receiver might rely upon the provi-
sions of the state statutes to recover fraudulent conveyances. Even
though the federal law contained detailed claw-back provisions, it did
not cover the field, and the state laws were not inconsistent with the
federal statute.2 ' This may be compared with the result in Robinson
v. Countywide Factors,' referred to by Professor Ziegel in his
paper.' The Australian position is a reflection of the nature of the
federal legislative power as concurrent with, rather than exclusive of,
that of the states.
I turn now to consider Crown priorities. As in Canada, the Australian
constitutional position as revealed in the decisions has been modified by statute
to reflect a political arrangement between the respective governments.
The position established by the High Court may be summarized as
follows:
(1) In the absence of valid legislation to the contrary, when debts are
due to the Crown in federal and state capacities, the prerogative
priority of each abates rateably. 24
(2) A state may not legislatively postpone the priority of the Common-
wealth for debts accruing to it under Commonwealth legislation even
17. 54 C.L.R. 332 (1936).
18. Id. at 344-46.
19. 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570).
20. 50 C.L.R. 341 (1934).
21. Id.
22. [1978] 1 S.C.R. 753.
23. See Ziegel, supra note 2.
24. Federal Comm'r of Taxation v. E.O. Farley Ltd., 63 C.L.R. 278 (1940).
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though the Commonwealth has not legislated inconsistently with state
law. The result follows from the nature of the federal structure and
the position of the federal government in it, rather than the exercise
of legislative powers of the Commonwealth.'
(3) The Commonwealth may legislate to give its debts priority over
secured as well as unsecured debts arising under state law.26
(4) The Commonwealth's legislative taxing powers generally are
concurrent with those of the states, but the powers of the Common-
wealth to impose excise taxes and customs duties are exlusive. In
the exercise of any of these legislative powers (e.g., the concurrent
power to tax income), the Commonwealth may create a priority in
its favor in bankruptcy and insolvency that ranks ahead of unpaid
state taxes. 27
(5) The priority enjoyed by the Crown under the common-law preroga-
tive and pursuant to statute will not, in the absence of an express
provision permitting an appeal against the original assessment,
include a tracing remedy into the hands of third-party volunteers
taking assets from the taxpayer.28
Finally, according to the Crown Debts (Priority) Act 1981 (Cth), with
some specified exceptions, the Crown in right of the Commonwealth subjects
itself to state and territory laws with respect to priority. The terms of the
principal provision are as follows:
3. Notwithstanding any prerogative right or privilege of the
Crown in right of the Commonwealth, the Crown in right of
the Commonwealth is subject to any provision of a law of a
State or Territory
(a) relating to the order in which debts or liabil-
ities of a body (whether corporate or unin-
corporate) are to be paid or discharged;
25. Commonwealth v. Cigamatic Pty. Ltd. (In Liquidation), 108 C.L.R. 372 (1962).
26. See generally Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, § 221P, (dealing with unremitted
installments of group tax withheld by employers from the wages of employees, which, in this
respect, has never been challenged).
27. Victoria v. Commonwealth, 99 C.L.R. 575 (1957). This may be compared with the
Canadian position, discussed in Ziegel, supra note 2.
28. Commonwealth v. McCormick, 155 C.L.R. 273 (1984); Deputy Comm'r of Taxation v.
Brown, 100 C.L.R. 32 (1957).
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(b) relating to the avoidance of preferences
received by creditors of a body (whether
corporate or unincorporate); or
(c) relating to the effect on creditors or mem-
bers of a body (whether corporate or unin-
corporate) of a compromise or arrangement
between the body and another person or
other persons.29
This result may be compared with that later reached in Canada with the 1991
legislation."
29. Crown Debts (Priority) Act 1981 (Cth) § 3.
30. See generally Ziegel, supra note 2.
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